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The Battle of Chickamauga, fought September 19–20, 1863, marked the end of a Union offensive in south-central Tennessee and northwestern Georgia called the Chickamauga Campaign. The battle was the most significant Union defeat in the Western Theater of the American Civil War.

After his successful Tullahoma Campaign, Rosecrans renewed the offensive, aiming to force the Confederates out of Chattanooga. The three corps comprising Rosecrans's army set out for Chattanooga by separate routes. In early September, Rosecrans consolidated his forces scattered in Tennessee and Georgia and forced Bragg's army out of Chattanooga, heading south. The Union troops followed it and brushed with it at Davis's Cross Roads. Bragg was determined to reoccupy Chattanooga and decided to meet a part of Rosecrans's army, defeat it, and then move back into the city. On September 17 he headed north, intending to attack the isolated XXI Corps. As Bragg marched north on September 18, his cavalry and infantry fought with Union cavalry and mounted infantry, which were armed with Spencer repeating rifles.

Fighting began in earnest on the morning of September 19, and Bragg's men strongly assaulted but did not break the Union line. The next day, Bragg continued his assault on the Union line, and in late morning, Rosecrans was informed that he had a gap in his line. In moving units to shore up the supposed gap, Rosecrans created an actual gap, and Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's men promptly exploited it, driving one-third of the Union army, including Rosecrans himself, from the field. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas took over command and began consolidating forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Although the Confederates launched determined assaults on Thomas and his men, they held until after dark. The Union retired to Chattanooga while the Confederates occupied the surrounding heights, besieging the city.

Background

In his successful Tullahoma Campaign in the summer of 1863, Rosecrans moved southeast from Murfreesboro, Tennessee, out-maneuvering Bragg and forcing him to abandoned Middle Tennessee and withdraw to the city of Chattanooga, suffering only 569 Union casualties along the way.⁵ General-in-chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck and President Abraham Lincoln were insistent that Rosecrans move quickly to take Chattanooga. Seizing the city would open the door for the Union to advance toward Atlanta and the heartland of the South. Chattanooga was a vital rail hub (with lines going north toward Nashville and Knoxville and south toward Atlanta), and an important manufacturing center for the production of iron and coke, located on the navigable Tennessee River. Situated between Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Raccoon Mountain, and Stringer's Ridge, Chattanooga occupied an important, defensible position.⁶

Although Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee contained about 52,000 men at the end of July, the Confederate government merged the Department of East Tennessee, under Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, into Bragg's Department of Tennessee, which added 17,800 men to Bragg's army, but also extended his command responsibilities northward to the Knoxville area. This brought a third subordinate into Bragg's command who had little or no respect for the commanding general.⁷ Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk and Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee had already made their animosity well known. Buckner's attitude was colored by Bragg's unsuccessful invasion of Buckner's native Kentucky in 1862, as well as by the loss of his command through the merger.⁸ A positive aspect for Bragg was Hardee's request to be transferred to Mississippi in July, but he was replaced by Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill, a general who did not get along with Robert E. Lee in Virginia.⁹ The Confederate War Department asked Bragg in early August if he could assume the offensive against Rosecrans if he were given reinforcements for Mississippi. He demurred, concerned about daunting geographical obstacles and logistical challenges, preferring to wait for Rosecrans to solve those same problems and attack him.¹⁰ He was also concerned about a sizable Union force under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside that was threatening Knoxville. Bragg withdrew his forces from advanced positions around Bridgeport, which left Rosecrans free to maneuver on the northern side of the Tennessee River. He concentrated his two infantry corps around Chattanooga and relied upon cavalry to cover his flanks, extending from northern Alabama to near Knoxville.¹¹

River of Death

The campaign and major battle take their name from West Chickamauga Creek. In popular histories, it is often said that Chickamauga is a Cherokee word meaning "river of death".¹² Peter Cozzens, who has written arguably the most definitive book on the battle, This Terrible Sound, wrote that this is the "loose translation".¹³ Glenn Tucker presents the translations of "stagnant water" (from the "lower Cherokee tongue"), "good country" (from the Chickasaw) and, "river of death" (dialect of the "upcountry Cherokee"). Tucker claims that the "river of death" came by its name not from early warfare, but from the location that the Cherokee contracted smallpox.¹⁴ James Mooney, in Myths of the Cherokee, wrote that Chickamauga is the more common spelling for Tsïkäma'gï, a name that has "lost any meaning in Cherokee and appears to be of foreign origin."¹⁵

Opposing forces

The Union Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Rosecrans, consisted of about 60,000 men,² composed of the following major organizations:¹⁶

The Confederate Army of Tennessee, commanded by Bragg, with about 65,000 men,³ was composed of the following major organizations:¹⁸

The organization of the Army of Tennessee into Wings was ordered the night of September 19 upon the arrival of Longstreet from Virginia. Prior to this, the corps commanders reported directly to Bragg.¹⁹

Initial movements in the Chickamauga Campaign

Planning the Union advance

Rosecrans faced significant logistical challenges if he chose to move forward. The Cumberland Plateau that separated the armies was a rugged, barren country over 30 miles long with poor roads and little opportunity for foraging. If Bragg attacked him during the advance, Rosecrans would be forced to fight with his back against the mountains and tenuous supply lines. He did not have the luxury of staying put, however, because he was under intense pressure from Washington to move forward in conjunction with Burnside's advance into East Tennessee. By early August, Halleck was frustrated enough with Rosecrans's delay that he ordered him to move forward immediately and to report daily the movement of each corps until he crossed the Tennessee River. Rosecrans was outraged at the tone of "recklessness, conceit and malice" of Halleck's order and insisted that he would be courting disaster if he were not permitted to delay his advance until the least August 17.²⁰

Rosecrans knew that he would have difficulty receiving supplies from his base on any advance across the Tennessee River and therefore thought it necessary to accumulate enough supplies and transport wagons that he could cross long distances without a reliable line of communications. His subordinate generals were supportive of this line of reasoning and counseled delay, all except for Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield, Rosecrans's chief of staff, a politician who understood the value of being on the record endorsing the Lincoln administration's priorities.²¹

The plan for the Union advance was to cross the Cumberland Plateau into the valley of the Tennessee River, pause briefly to accumulate some supplies, and then cross the river itself. An opposed crossing of the wide river was not feasible, so Rosecrans devised a deception to distract Bragg above Chattanooga while the army crossed downstream. Then the Army would advance on a wide front through the mountains. The XXI Corps under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden would advance against the city from the west, the XIV Corps under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas would cross over Lookout Mountain 20 miles south of the city, while the XX Corps under Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook and the Cavalry Corps under Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley would advance even farther to the southeast toward Bragg's railroad supply line leading from Atlanta. If executed correctly, this plan would cause Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga or be trapped in the city without supplies.²²

Crossing the Tennessee

Rosecrans ordered his army to move on August 16. The difficult road conditions meant a full week passed before they reached the Tennessee River Valley. They encamped while engineers made preparations for crossing the river. Meanwhile, Rosecrans's deception plan was underway. Col. John T. Wilder of the XIV Corps moved his mounted infantry brigade (the Lightning Brigade, which first saw prominence at Hoover's Gap) to the north of Chattanooga. His men pounded on tubs and sawed boards, sending pieces of wood downstream, to make the Confederates think that rafts were being constructed for a crossing north of the city. His artillery, commanded by Capt. Eli Lilly, bombarded the city from Stringer's Ridge for two weeks, an operation sometimes known as the Second Battle of Chattanooga. The deception worked and Bragg was convinced that the Union crossing would be above the city, in conjunction with Burnside's advancing Army of the Ohio from Knoxville.²³

The first crossing of the Tennessee River was accomplished by the XX Corps at Caperton's Ferry, 4 miles from Stevenson on August 29, where construction began on a 1,250-foot pontoon bridge. The second crossing, of the XIV Corps, was at Shellmound, Tennessee, on August 30. They were quickly followed by most of the XXI Corps. The fourth crossing site was at the mouth of Battle Creek, Tennessee, where the rest of the XIV Corps crossed on August 31. Without permanent bridges, the Army of the Cumberland could not be supplied reliably, so another bridge was constructed at Bridgeport by Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan's division, spanning 2,700 feet in three days. Virtually all of the Union army, other than elements of the Reserve Corps kept behind to guard the railroad, had safely crossed the river by September 4. They faced more mountainous terrain and road networks that were just as treacherous as the ones they had already traversed.²⁴

The Confederate high command was concerned about this development and took steps to reinforce the Army of Tennessee. General Joseph E. Johnston's army dispatched on loan two weak divisions (about 9,000 men) from Mississippi under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge and Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker by September 4, and General Robert E. Lee dispatched a corps under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet from the Army of Northern Virginia. Only two divisions of Virginians reached Bragg, of which only five brigades (about 5,000 effectives) arrived in time for the second day of the Battle of Chickamauga on September 20.²⁵

Into Georgia

The three infantry corps of Rosecrans's army advanced by separate routes, on the only three roads that were suitable for such movements. On the right flank, McCook's XX Corps moved southwest to Valley Head, Alabama; in the center, Thomas's XIV Corps moved just across the border to Trenton, Georgia; and on the left, Crittenden's XXI Corps moved directly toward Chattanooga around Lookout Mountain. On September 8, after learning that Rosecrans had crossed into his rear, Bragg evacuated Chattanooga and moved his army south along the LaFayette Road toward LaFayette, Georgia. The Union army occupied Chattanooga on September 9. Rosecrans telegraphed Halleck, "Chattanooga is ours without a struggle and East Tennessee is free."²⁶ Bragg was aware of Rosecrans's dispositions and planned to defeat him by attacking his isolated corps individually. The corps were spread out over 40 miles (65 km), too far apart to support each other.²⁷

Rosecrans was convinced that Bragg was demoralized and fleeing to either Dalton, Rome, or Atlanta, Georgia. Instead, Bragg's Army of Tennessee was encamped at LaFayette, some 20 miles (32 km) south of Chattanooga. Confederate soldiers who posed as deserters deliberately added to this impression. Thomas firmly cautioned Rosecrans that a pursuit of Bragg was unwise because the Army of the Cumberland was too widely dispersed and its supply lines were tenuous. Rosecrans, exultant at his success in capturing Chattanooga, discounted Thomas's advice. He ordered McCook to swing across Lookout Mountain at Winston's Gap and use his cavalry to break Bragg's railroad supply line at Resaca, Georgia. Crittenden was to take Chattanooga and then turn south in pursuit of Bragg. Thomas was to continue his advance toward LaFayette.²⁸

Davis's Cross Roads

Thomas's lead division, under Maj. Gen. James Negley, intended to cross McLemore's Cove and use Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain to reach LaFayette. Negley was 12 hours ahead of Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird's division, the nearest reinforcements. Braxton Bragg hoped to trap Negley by attacking through the cove from the northeast, forcing the Union division to its destruction at the cul-de-sac at the southwest end of the valley. Early on the morning of September 10, Bragg ordered Polk's division under Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman to march 13 miles southwest into the cove and strike Negley's flank. He also ordered D.H. Hill to send Cleburne's division from LaFayette through Dug Gap to strike Negley's front, making sure the movement was coordinated with Hindman's.²⁹

Entering the cove with 4,600 men, Negley's division encountered Confederate skirmishers, but pressed forward to Davis's Cross Roads. Informed that there was a large Confederate force approaching on his left, Negley took up a position in the mouth of the cove and remained there until 3 a.m. on September 11. Hill claimed that Bragg's orders reached him very late and began offering excuses for why he could not advance—Cleburne was sick in bed and the road through Dug Gap was obstructed by felled timber. He advised calling off the operation. Hindman, who had executed Bragg's orders promptly and had advanced to within 4 miles of Negley's division, became overly cautious when he realized that Hill would not be attacking on schedule and ordered his men to stop. Bragg reinforced Hindman with two divisions of Buckner's corps, which were encamped near Lee and Gordon's Mill. When Buckner reached Hindman at 5 p.m. on September 10, the Confederates outnumbered Negley's division 3 to 1, but failed to attack.³⁰

Infuriated that his orders were being defied and a golden opportunity was being lost, Bragg issued new orders for Hindman to attack early September 11. Cleburne, who was not sick as Hill had claimed, cleared the felled timber from Dug Gap and prepared to advance when he heard the sound of Hindman's guns. By this time, however, Baird's division had reached Negley's, and Negley had withdrawn his division to a defensive position just east of the crossroads. The two Union divisions then withdrew to Stevens Gap. Hindman's men skirmished with Baird's rear guard, but could not prevent the withdrawal or defeat the Union force.³¹

Final maneuvers

Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and, as he wrote in his official report—"as a matter of life and death"—began to concentrate his scattered forces.³² On September 12 he ordered McCook and the cavalry to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Thomas, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.³³

Crittenden's corps began moving from Ringgold toward Lee and Gordon's Mill. Forests cavalry reported the movement across the Confederate front and Bragg saw another offensive opportunity. He ordered Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk to attack Crittenden's lead division, under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, at dawn on September 13, with Polk's corps and Walker's corps. Bragg rode to the scene after hearing no sound of battle and found that there were no preparations being made to attack. Once again, Bragg was angry that one of his subordinates did not attack as ordered, but by that morning it was too late—all of Crittenden's corps had passed by and concentrated at Lee and Gordon's Mill.³⁴

For the next four days, both armies attempted to improve their dispositions. Rosecrans continued to concentrate his forces, intending to withdraw as a single body to Chattanooga. Bragg, learning of McCook's movement at Alpine, feared the Federals might be planning a double envelopment. At a council of war on September 15, Bragg's corps commanders agreed that an offensive in the direction of Chattanooga offered their best option.³⁵

By September 17, McCook's corps had reached Stevens Gap and the three Union corps were now much less vulnerable to individual defeat. Yet Bragg decided that he still had an opportunity. Reinforced with two divisions arriving from Virginia under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, and a division from Mississippi under Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, he decided to move his army northward on the morning of September 18 and advance toward Chattanooga, forcing Rosecrans's army out to fight or to withdraw. If Rosecrans fought, he risked being driven back into McLemore's Cove. The Confederate army was to move beyond the Federal left flank at Lee and Gordon's Mill and then cross West Chickamauga Creek. He specified four crossing points, from north to south: Johnson's division at Reed's Bridge, Walker's Reserve Corps at Alexander's Bridge, Buckner's corps at Thedford's Ford, and Polk's corps at Dalton's Ford. Hill's corps would anchor the army's left flank and the cavalry under Forrest and Wheeler would cover Bragg's right and left flanks, respectively.³⁶

Opening engagements: September 18

Bushrod Johnson's division took the wrong road from Ringgold, but eventually headed west on the Reed's Bridge Road. At 7 a.m. his men encountered cavalry pickets from Col. Robert Minty's brigade, guarding the approach to Reed's Bridge. Being outnumbered five to one, Minty's men eventually withdrew across the bridge after being pressured by elements of Forrest's cavalry, but could not destroy the bridge in time to prevent Johnson's men from crossing. At 4:30 p.m., when Johnson had reached Jay's Mill, Maj. Gen. John B. Hood of Longstreet's Corps arrived from the railroad station at Catoosa and took command of the column. He ordered Johnson to use the Jay's Mill Road instead of the Brotherton Road, as Johnson had planned.³⁷

At Alexander's Bridge to the south, Col. John T. Wilder's mounted infantry brigade defended the crossing against the approach of Walker's Corps. Armed with Spencer repeating rifles and Capt. Lilly's four guns of the 18th Indiana Battery, Wilder was able to hold off a brigade of Brig. Gen. St. John Liddell's division, which suffered 105 casualties against Wilder's superior firepower. Walker moved his men downstream a mile to Lambert's Ford, an unguarded crossing, and was able to cross around 4:30 p.m., considerably behind schedule. Wilder, concerned about his left flank after Minty's loss of Reed's Bridge, withdrew and establish a new blocking position east of the Lafayette Road, near the Viniard farm.³⁸

By dark, Johnson's division had halted in front of Wilder's position. Walker had crossed the creek, but his troops were well scattered along the road behind Johnson. Buckner had been able to push only one brigade across the creek at Thedford's Ford. Polk's troops were facing Crittenden's at Lee and Gordon's Mill and D.H. Hill's corps guarded crossing sites to the south.³⁹

Although Bragg had achieved some degree of surprise, he failed to exploit it strongly. Rosecrans, observing the dust raised by the marching Confederates in the morning, anticipated Bragg's plan. He ordered Thomas and McCook to Crittenden's support, and while the Confederates were crossing the creek, Thomas began to arrive in Crittenden's rear area.⁴⁰

Battle of Chickamauga

September 19

On the morning of September 19, Thomas's four divisions were spread out north of Crittenden's position. Bragg, however, was unaware of the arrival of Thomas and believed that Crittenden occupied the left flank of the Union position. The Union commanders were equally unaware of the Confederate dispositions and did not know that they had crossed the creek the night before. Early that morning, the Confederate corps under Buckner and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's division joined Hood and Walker. The fighting that morning started with an attack by Thomas, who believed he was attacking only a small force under cavalry commander Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest to his front. The fight expanded and lasted throughout the day as Bragg and Rosecrans engaged more of their armies. The fighting would seesaw back and forth with first one side attacking and then in turn being attacked, but as the day wore on the Confederates' numerical advantage began to be felt and the Union forces began to be slowly driven back toward the LaFayette Road.

That night, as Rosecrans rearranged his divisions to form a more compact defensive line, Bragg made plans to resume his offensive on September 20 by once again attempting to envelop the Union left flank. He reorganized his army into two wings, commanded by Polk and Longstreet (who had just arrived from Virginia), based on locations of units at the time, without regard for the existing command structures. Bragg seemed to have been unaware of the severity of the fighting that day, because when Longstreet arrived that night, Bragg told him that "the troops have been engaged in ... severe skirmishing while endeavoring to get in line of battle."

September 20

On September 20, Confederate Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill was supposed to assault the Union right flank at 7:30 a.m. However, he delayed two hours, later claiming he had not received orders.General Thomas's men would use the quiet morning hours to construct crude breastworks along their line around Kelly field. Shortly after Hill's attack commenced, one of his divisions under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge attacked Thomas's left flank and was able to flank it and gain Thomas's rear temporarily. By 10:15 a.m., part of Maj. Gen. James S. Negley's division, which had been held in reserve, had pushed north and repulsed the assault. The next Confederate attack was by Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, but he was stopped by fire from the breastworks at Kelly Field. Bragg was concerned about the failure of his attacks on the Union left and ordered a general assault along the entire line, changing his strategy from a flanking attack to a full frontal assault. At 11 a.m., assaults by Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart and Walker were repulsed.

Thomas requested reinforcements, and Rosecrans began shifting units to react to the initial attacks on his flank. At about 11 a.m., General T.J. Wood was ordered to replace Brig. Gen. John Milton Brannan's division, which had been ordered to Thomas's aid. Brannan had not followed the order, however, after being attacked by Stewart's men; the order was poorly written and told Wood to close up and support Reynolds. Although he could not close up on him, he could move his men to a supporting position, which created a real gap that corps commander Alexander McCook was trying to fill when Longstreet's entire wing of the army attacked. They were able to exploit this gap and struck the columns of Union soldiers in their flanks as they moved. Longstreet had, however inadvertently, achieved another successful surprise assault, for which he had a well-deserved reputation in the war.

The Union troops in the gap began to retreat, carrying Rosecrans along with them, and McCook's and Crittenden's commands soon followed. By 1 p.m., Thomas was the sole commander left on the battlefield. He received word from Rosecrans to withdraw the troops to Rossville, Georgia, a few miles to the north in the direction of Chattanooga. But Thomas was too heavily engaged to move. He began consolidating forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. The Union Reserve Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, who was north of the battlefield at MacAfee's Church, heard the firing to the south and, on his own initiative, sent Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman to support Thomas. Steedman arrived about 2:30 p.m., just in time to stop Longstreet's attempt to envelop Thomas's right flank. At about 4 p.m., Longstreet made one final effort but could not break the stubborn Union defense. At the same time, Thomas repulsed a renewed assault by Cheatham on his left flank.

Aftermath

Thomas withdrew to Rossville that night. His heroic defense that day earned him the nickname The Rock of Chickamauga. It is recognized that although his troops fought valiantly, it was his personal determination that saved the Union army from disaster. Bragg failed to pursue the Union forces, due to the horrible losses he had suffered and also for want of logistical support.

On September 21, Rosecrans's army withdrew to the city of Chattanooga while the Confederates occupied the surrounding heights and laid siege upon the Union forces. Unable to break the siege, Rosecrans was relieved of his command of the Army of the Cumberland on October 19. It took the relief forces of Maj. Gens. Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman and the Battle of Chattanooga that November to break Bragg's grip on the city.

Considered a Confederate victory for halting the Union advance, the Battle of Chickamauga was a costly one. It claimed an estimated 34,624 casualties (16,170 for the Union; 18,454 for the Confederates).

References

Notes

^ The NPS battle description by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission and Kennedy, p. 227, cite September 18–20. However, fighting on September 18 was relatively minor in comparison to the following two days and only small portions of the armies were engaged. The Official Records of the war list September 18 activities as "Skirmishes at Pea Vine Ridge, Alexander's and Reed's Bridges, Dyer's Ford, Spring Creek, and near Stevens' Gap, Georgia." Chickamauga is almost universally referred to as a two-day battle, fought on September 19–20.
^ ^a ^b Strength figures vary widely in different accounts. Cozzens, p. 534: 57,840; Hallock, p. 77: 58,222; Eicher, p. 590: 58,000; Esposito, map 112: 64,000; Korn, p. 32: 59,000; Tucker, p. 125: 64,500 with 170 pieces of artillery.
^ ^a ^b Strength figures vary in different accounts. Cozzens, p. 534: about 68,000; Hallock, p. 77: 66,326; Eicher, p. 590: 66,000; Esposito, map 112: 62,000; Lamers, p. 152: "barely 40,000, of which 28,500 were infantry"; Tucker, p. 125: 71,500 with 200 pieces of artillery.
^ ^a ^b Eicher, p. 590.
^ Lamers, p. 289.
^ Korn, p. 32; Cozzens, pp. 21-23, 139; Eicher, p. 577; Woodworth, pp. 12-13; Lamers, p. 293; Kennedy, p. 226.
^ Cozzens, pp. 87-89; Tucker, pp. 81-82.
^ Hallock, p. 44; Cozzens, pp. 156-58.
^ Cozzens, p. 155.
^ Woodworth, p. 50.
^ Woodworth, p. 53; Hallock, pp. 44-45; Lamers, p. 138; Cozzens, pp. 163-65.
^ See, for instance, Eicher, p. 580.
^ Cozzens, p. 90.
^ Tucker, p. 122.
^ Mooney, James, Myths of the Cherokee, 19th Annual Report of the Bureau of the American Ethnology, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900, glossary, page 513.
^ Commanders and corps "present for duty" figures on September 10, 1863, from the Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXX/1, pp. 169-70.
^ Cozzens, p. 543: Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, the Cavalry Corps commander at the beginning of the campaign, fell ill before the battle and did not participate.
^ Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXX/2, pp. 11-20.
^ Cozzens, pp. 299-300.
^ Esposito, text for map 109; Lamers, pp. 293, 296, 298; Robertson (Fall 2006), p. 9; Woodworth, pp. 48, 52.
^ Woodworth, p. 48; Lamers, p. 294; Tucker, pp. 50-51.
^ Eicher, p. 577; Lamers, pp. 301-2; Robertson (Fall 2006), p. 13.
^ Esposito, map 109; Lamers, pp. 301-3; Kennedy, p. 226; Robertson (Fall 2006), p. 19; Woodworth, pp. 53-54; Hallock, p. 47; Tucker, pp. 16-17; Korn, pp. 33-34.
^ Eicher, pp. 577-78; Woodworth, pp. 58-59; Robertson (Fall 2006), pp. 19-22; Esposito, map 110.
^ Robertson (Fall 2006), p. 14; Hallock, p. 49; Cozzens, pp. 149-52; Woodworth, p. 65; Eicher, p. 578.
^ Korn, p. 35.
^ Woodworth, pp. 60, 66; Cozzens, p. 173; Hallock, p. 54; Robertson (Fall 2006), pp. 44-50; Eicher, p. 578; Esposito, map 110.
^ Korn, pp. 35-37; Woodworth, pp. 62-63; Tucker, pp. 29-30, 62; Esposito, map 110; Eicher, p. 578; Robertson (Spring 2007), pp. 8, 14.
^ Cozzens, p. 175; Hallock, p. 54; Tucker, pp. 62-64; Robertson (Spring 2007), pp. 14-16; Eicher, p. 578; Woodworth, pp. 67-68; Korn, pp. 37-38.
^ Robertson (Spring 2007), pp. 20-22; Cozzens, pp. 177-78; Tucker, pp. 66-67: Kennedy, p. 227; Hallock, pp. 57-58; Esposito, map 111; Korn, p. 39; Woodworth, pp. 68-69; Eicher, p. 579.
^ Tucker, pp. 69-71; Robertson (Spring 2007), pp. 42-45; Cozzens, pp. 179-85; Hallock, pp. 58-60; Woodworth, pp. 70-73; Eicher, p. 579; Esposito, map 111.
^ Lamers, p. 313.
^ Lamers, p. 315; Robertson (Fall 2007), pp. 7-8; Korn, p. 42; Woodworth, pp. 73-74; Esposito, map 112.
^ Cozzens, pp. 186-90; Korn, p. 39; Eicher, pp. 579-80; Esposito, map 111; Woodworth, pp. 74-75; Hallock, pp. 61-63; Robertson (Fall 2007), pp. 8, 19-22.
^ Hallock, p. 63; Robertson (Fall 2007), pp. 22-24; Cozzens, pp. 190-94.
^ Robertson (Fall 2007), p. 40; Tucker, p. 112; Cozzens, pp. 195-97; Lamers, pp. 321-22; Woodworth, pp. 79-82; Esposito, map 112; Eicher, pp. 580-81.
^ Robertson (Fall 2007), pp. 43-46, 48-49; Korn, p. 44; Woodworth, p. 82; Cozzens, pp. 197, 199; Tucker, p. 113.
^ Woodworth, p. 83; Cozzens, p. 198; Tucker, pp. 112-17; Robertson (Fall 2007), pp. 46-47.
^ Cozzens, pp. 199-200; Kennedy, p. 230; Robertson (Fall 2007), pp. 49-50; Eicher, p. 581; Esposito, map 112.
^ Woodworth, p. 85; Lamers, p. 322; Tucker, p. 118; Eicher, p. 581; Esposito, map 112; Robertson (Fall 2007), p. 43.

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